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Abstract In this article I investigate the nature and extent of filial obligations. The
question what (adult) children owe their parents is not only philosophically inter-
esting, but also of increasing relevance in ageing societies. Its answer matters to
elderly people and their adult children, and is relevant to social policy issues in
various ways. I present the strongest arguments for and against three models of filial
obligations: the ‘past parental sacrifices’ model, the ‘special relationship’ model,
and the conventionalist model. There is something to be said—and after consider-
ation of objections something remains to be said—for all three models. In other
words: filial obligations have more than one source, and an adequate model of filial
obligations should reflect this. On its own, each of the above models is one-sided.
They also fail to show the connections between the question of filial obligations and
various other issues, such as issues of gender justice, the extent of institutionali-
zation of eldercare, and social conventions regarding filial responsibility. Therefore,
I integrate what I think we should keep from the aforementioned models into a
contextual, pluralist model, which places filial obligations in a broader social and
cultural context and relates them to issues of social justice. The model also high-
lights the difference between general and specific filial obligations, and the factors
that determine their nature and extent, thus enabling a deeper and more compre-
hensive understanding of filial obligations.
Keywords Children  Filial obligations  Filial responsibility  Parents 
Special obligations
A. Schinkel (&)
Faculty of Psychology and Education, VU University Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 1,
1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands
e-mail: a.schinkel@vu.nl
123
J Ethics (2012) 16:395–420
DOI 10.1007/s10892-012-9132-8
1 Introduction
Since Jane English (1979) answered the question ‘What do grown children owe their
parents?’ with the provocative assertion that they owe them nothing, philosophical
debate about filial obligations has been ongoing. Not that this is all due to the
stimulating nature of English’s essay, of course. That this debate still continues after
30 years has to do, rather, with three things: firstly, the continuing and even increasing
practical relevance of the subject; secondly, the philosophical interest of the subject;
and thirdly, the simple fact that the topic is still far from being exhaustively explored.
The present article as a whole is intended to support the latter assertion, so I will limit
myself to a brief elaboration of the first two points here.
The debate about filial obligations is set against the background of ageing (Western)
societies. In most countries in the world the number of old people relative to the rest of
the population has been increasing for some time, and is expected to increase
significantly in the coming decades, making the questions who will and who should
care for dependent elderly and ensure elderly people’s important needs are met all the
more pertinent (Human Development Report 2009, pp. 191ff, table L: ‘Demographic
trends’; Gavrilov and Heuveline 2003). A common government response to
population ageing and the attendant increase of expenditure on the elderly is to shift
some of the burden of caring for (and financially supporting) the elderly (back) to the
elderly themselves or to a third party. Several countries, such as Germany and the
Netherlands, have raised the pension age. With regard to eldercare, the general trend in
Europe is to shift from institutional care to (formal or informal) homecare, and from in-
kind to cash transfers (Simonazzi 2010, p. 135; Rummery 2010; Le Bihan and Martin
2010). The result is an increased burden for the children, financially, emotionally, in
terms of time and energy, or a combination of these things.1
Social policies increasingly rely on filial responsibility, but at the same time, over
the last couple of decades, society has changed in ways that leave less room for the
fulfilment of filial obligations. Women, who traditionally did most of the caring for
elderly parents, increasingly participate in the labour market, leaving them less time
(and sometimes less energy) for caregiving. It is therefore not really surprising that
it seems some women no longer perceive it as ‘natural’ to care for dependent family
members (Guberman and Lavoie 2010).2 Furthermore, various studies suggest that
adult children are most willing to provide emotional support, and least willing to
provide financial support (with caregiving somewhere in-between) (Ng 2002; Lye
1996, p. 96); it is worth noting that this seems to be matched by most elderly’s
preferences (Callahan 1985, p. 33; Lye 1996, p. 96). All this suggests there are
tensions between current social policies regarding the elderly and adult children’s
ability and willingness to care for their elderly parents.
The existence of non-Western ethnic minorities in many Western countries
provides further poignancy to the question of filial obligations. In the Netherlands,
for instance, especially Turkish and Moroccon immigrant elderly hold considerably
1 Cf. Aronson and Neysmith (1997) for the shift from institutional to community-based care in Canada;
they also note this is the trend in ‘most western industrialized nations’.
2 On this perceived ‘naturalness’ see Holstein (2000, pp. 236ff.).
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more demanding views of filial obligation than native Dutch elderly, but it is very
well conceivable that these views and the concomitant obligations will, to some
extent, clash with the actual behaviour of their children (De Valk and Schans 2008).
In sum, then, questions regarding the nature and extent of filial obligations will matter
to both elderly people and their adult children, and they are relevant to social policy
issues in various ways (cf. Keller 2006, pp. 254–255; Nelson 2002; Collingridge and
Miller 1997; Wicclair 1990, p. 164). But they are also philosophically interesting, for
instance with regard to the debate between adherents to ‘impartialist’ moral theories and
theories that make room for partiality towards those with whom one has a special
relation of some kind (Keller 2006, p. 255; Sommers 1986), and with regard to the
difference between moral contextualism and moral relativism.
In what follows I will first (in Sect. 2) present the strongest arguments for and
against three models of filial obligations: the ‘past parental sacrifices’ model, the
‘special relationship’ model, and the conventionalist model. All three come in
different variants, with different strengths and weaknesses.3 In Section 3 I will
integrate what I think we should retain from these models into a contextual, pluralist
model, which places filial obligations in a broader social and cultural context and
relates them to issues of social justice.4 There is something to be said—and after
consideration of objections something remains to be said—for all three models. In
other words: filial obligations have more than one source, and an adequate model of
filial obligations should reflect this.
2 Three Models of Filial Obligations
Filial obligations, if the term is to mean anything, are the special obligations that
children have towards their parents; and in this article I am specifically concerned
with the obligations of adult children towards their elderly (or otherwise in some
respect needy) parents. If it were the case that there are only general obligations
towards elderly people, i.e., obligations that every adult has towards elderly people,
then people would also have them towards their parents, but these would not be filial
obligations, because they would not be special obligations. Filial obligations are
3 Collingridge and Miller (1997) discuss a ‘reciprocity model’, ‘needs-based model’, ‘friendship model’,
and ‘conventionalist model’. I see the reciprocity model as one variant of the past parental sacrifices
model (I take this name from Wicclair 1990), the gratitude model being the other. I do not discuss the
needs-based model, for it does not ground or explain special (filial) obligations, but only general
obligations. Li (1997) distinguishes between ‘English’s Friendship Model’, ‘Belliotti’s Contribution to
Self Principle’, ‘Narveson’s Prudent Investor Thesis’, ‘Sommers’ Conventional Expectation Thesis’,
‘Blustein’s Gratitude Theory’ and ‘The Confucian Alternative’. I take the latter to be a type of
conventionalist approach, and I leave Belliotti’s and Narveson’s approaches aside because they have
(rightly, I think) played no significant role in the debate about filial obligations. Keller (2006) also
provides an overview of different models (or ‘theories’, as he calls them): the debt theory, the gratitude
theory, and the friendship theory, to which he adds his own ‘special goods’ theory (which shows strong
similarities to Claudia Mills’ approach in Mills 2003). I subsume both the friendship theory and the
special goods theory under the heading of the ‘special relationship’ model.
4 Relations with issues of social justice are also discussed by Callahan (1985) and Thompson (2003);
Jecker (2002) discusses filial obligations themselves in terms of duties of justice.
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obligations that only (adult) children have towards their parents, obligations that
they have as their parents’ children.5
The three models I discuss below all (attempt to) provide an account of the basis
or source(s) of filial obligations, of that which justifies the special moral demands
made of children by or on behalf of their parents. In doing so, they also give a
(partial) account of the nature of filial obligations, of what is owed6 (e.g. gratitude,
respect, intimacy) and the kinds of things children are bound to provide or to do
(e.g. emotional or financial support, keeping in touch, caregiving), and their extent
(limited or unlimited, equal to what parents did for them or not, depending on ability
and/or need, etc.).
2.1 The Past Parental Sacrifices Model
Wicclair considers past parental sacrifices ‘arguably the most promising’ candidate
source of ethical obligations. This account, which may be seen as the ‘traditional’
account, states simply that because parents make considerable sacrifices for their
children (which they do not make for others) in promoting their well-being,
education, et cetera, children owe it to their parents to give them ‘special
consideration’ ‘when they become old and dependent’ (Wicclair 1990, p. 165).
5 I deliberately leave open here the question whether it is for contingent or noncontingent reasons that
children have these obligations towards their parents. For a duty to reciprocate, for instance, it may be
neither here nor there that it is one’s parents to whom one owes this duty—that would depend on what one
has to reciprocate for. Moreover, the fact that parents tend to make great sacrifices with a view to their
children’s well-being could be seen as contingently related to parenthood, depending on what one’s
definition of ‘parenthood’ is, and how normative it is (but see also footnote 16). In another article, it may
be worth considering whether the different models of filial obligations can be categorized according to
their answers to the questions (1) whether the obligation-engendering factors are intrinsic to the parent–
child relationship or not, and (2) whether the obligations are special instances of general obligations (such
as the duty of reciprocity) or obligations of a special kind—obligations of a kind one can only have
towards one’s parents. The second question would have to be subdivided into question 2a, for general
filial obligations, and 2b, for specific filial obligations (see Section 3 for this distinction).
6 In the literature on filial obligations, what children owe to their parents is not discussed in terms of
negative and positive duties; except in Sommers (1986, p. 446; see 2.3) the distinction is not even
mentioned, and I, as one anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics observed, do not make use of it
either. There are a number of reasons not to pursue the distinction when trying to determine whether there
are (special) filial obligations and if so, of what nature and extent. One is that—beyond the intuitive
difference between negative and positive duties—one would have to commit oneself to a specific position
concerning (the relevance of) the difference, about which there is much debate; this would detract from
the intended topic of discussion. First we need to determine whether there is a basis for claiming that
children have special obligations to their parents; as a next step we could discuss whether the distinction
between positive and negative duties applies to them. Another, but similar, reason is that one would easily
get tied up in a debate about the question whether special duties must be seen as a subclass of positive
duties or not, or, more generally, about the relationship between special duties and positive/negative
duties (cf. Malm 1991, p. 188 and footnote 5). That noted, it is probably true that most authors on filial
obligations see them as duties to do good or prevent harm (positive duties) rather than duties not to cause
harm (negative duties). And so, in his defence of the moral relevance of the act-omission distinction, does
Abelson (1982). I believe this is correct as far as general filial obligations go (for which, see Section 3);
children have no other (general) negative duties towards their parents than anybody has to anyone else.
But there may be specific filial obligations of a negative kind, related to the specific ways in which parents
are vulnerable to children. That, however, would be a topic for another article. All the concrete examples
of filial obligations I give in the present article concern positive duties.
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One variant holds that children have duties of indebtedness or reciprocity (Post
1989), another that they have duties of gratitude (Berger 1975, p. 300; Blustein 1982;
Callahan 1985; Zola 2001).7 Duties of indebtedness entail that what A owes B is (1)
roughly equivalent to what A received from B; (2) this is more or less precisely
specifiable, and (3) it is possible to determine when the debt has been discharged. With
duties of gratitude these conditions do not obtain (Wicclair 1990, p. 175).8
The past parental sacrifice model has a strong intuitive appeal, and it is not
surprising that, traditionally, it has played an important part in Western accounts of
filial obligations, as it still does in many parts of the world.9 Generally speaking, we
consider it normal and fitting when people feel grateful or even indebted to people who
did much, or made a considerable effort, to benefit them in some way—and
(fortunately) many people feel their parents did do (and perhaps still do) many things
to their benefit. The idea that all the things parents do with a view to their children’s
well-being, happiness, or perhaps their salvation—all the time, energy, and resources
they spend—counts for nothing when it comes to determining children’s obligations to
their parents later in life will strike many people as odd, not to say vile. Moreover, it
seems odd to say that there is no relation at all between the nature and extent of filial
obligations and the magnitude of parental sacrifices or efforts on behalf of their
children. Surely, the former depend on the latter at least to some extent?
Plausible as this may seem, powerful objections have been raised against the past
parental sacrifices model of filial obligations (in one or both of its main variants). I
will summarize what I take to be the strongest objections:
1. Whereas parents choose to take upon themselves the obligations that come with
parenthood, children have no choice in the matter. They do not ask to be born,
and since they are not there when their parents decide to have them, they cannot
reject the sacrifices their parents will make on their behalf, and therefore cannot
voluntarily accept filial obligations. This also means that there cannot be an
implicit contract between parents and children that requires the latter to
reciprocate for what the former did for them (Blustein 1982; Levy and Gross
1979; Goodin 1985, pp. 83–86; Thompson 2003).
7 For Post, reciprocity includes the elements of gratitude and proportionality; Zola believes filial
obligations to be obligations of gratitude, but sees gratitude as the form reciprocity should take. For the
distinction between indebtedness or reciprocity on the one hand and gratitude on the other, see Wicclair
(1990), Gerber (1990), and Nelson (2002).
8 Interestingly, Keller (2006, pp. 260–262) contrasts filial duties with duties of gratitude on the ground
(among others) that the former, unlike the latter, are ‘ongoing and open-ended’ and can be ‘very
demanding’. I take it that Keller’s and Wicclair’s views are more compatible than they seem. They both
make the point that duties of gratitude have no clearly determinable content (which also means there can
be no equivalence relation), and Wicclair’s point that with duties of gratitude it is impossible to say when
they have been discharged should not be taken to mean they are ongoing, open-ended and demanding.
However, Wicclair takes filial obligations to be examples of duties of gratitude, and Keller rejects the
gratitude model.
9 A common reference in the literature is Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, written
between 1765 and 1769, which state that ‘[t]he duties of children to their parents arise from a principle of
natural justice and retribution’ (Blackstone 1893, Book I, ch. 16, Section I.3). From the explanation it is
clear that filial obligations are owed in return for what the parents did for their children, such as giving
them existence, protecting them, and providing for them (cf. Callahan 1985, p. 33).
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2. When parents decide to (try to) have children, they voluntarily take upon
themselves the obligation to care for their children, to protect them, provide for
them, et cetera.10 If they do not do these things, they fail to do their duty as parents.
Since they are merely doing their duty, the children incur no special obligations
towards them for providing these goods and services (Daniels 1988, pp. 30–31;
Simmons 1979, p. 182). Only when parents go beyond the call of duty can
reciprocity or gratitude be owed (Blustein 1982, p. 182; Callahan 1985, p. 35).
3. The language of ‘owing’ seems out of place with regard to parent–child relations,
especially or at least when this is understood in terms of indebtedness and
reciprocal rights and duties (English 1979; Blustein 1982; Goodin 1985, p. 89;
Wicclair 1990, pp. 172–173). In relations of love and/or friendship, which is what
parent–child relationships should be (like), one does not and should not keep track
of what one person has done for another, and how much is owed in return.
Moreover, ‘transactions’ between family members do not leave the parties and
their relation the same when they are completed; this distinguishes them from
relations of indebtedness, where, after payment of the debt, the relation returns to
what it was before the debt was incurred (Goodin 1985, p. 89).
4. Parental sacrifices are normally, and for the most part, motivated by love and
affection, not made as a favour, and therefore they require no return (English
1979). It may be that parental sacrifices—or actually: parental love—leads to
mutual love, affection, or friendship, which means that children will also aid
their parents out of love, but this is not like the discharge of a duty.
5. The reciprocity model implausibly suggests that (elderly) parents’ actual needs
make no difference to what children owe them. Poor parents who could provide
only minimal (material) benefits to their children are owed very little when they
are old and needy, and rich parents are owed a lot, even when they are still rich
and not needy at all. This cannot be right (Collingridge and Miller 1997, p. 124;
Goodin 1985, pp. 84, 88). (This is the only objection to the past parental
sacrifices model that does defend the notion of filial obligations.)
The above arguments, plausible as they may sound, are not without their problems.
First of all, it seems very well possible involuntarily to incur obligations (Wang 1998;
Wicclair 1990, p. 167; Collingridge and Miller 1997, p. 127). Wang uses the example
of an able swimmer (Fred) who sees that a child (Sheila) is drowning in a swimming
pool; clearly, Fred has a moral obligation to save Sheila, even though he was never in a
position to reject or consent to such an obligation. It is forced upon him by the situation,
but in no way does this deter from the fact that it is his duty. So the absence of a
voluntary choice to accept (future) obligations is not in itself an argument against (the
past parental sacrifice view of) filial obligations. Wicclair also argues against the
voluntarist objection, which he summarizes as the objection that ‘parental sacrifices
are generally unrequested’ (Wicclair 1990, p. 166). He uses an example that relates
directly to filial obligations, introducing the twins Mindy and Sarah, whose parents
made them take expensive violin lessons. Mindy enjoyed them and became a child
prodigy, Sarah was forced to take the lessons against her expressed will. Mindy,
10 For the sake of simplicity I will disregard cases of involuntary parenthood here.
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Wicclair (1990, p. 167) argues, ‘‘cannot plausibly support her claim that she owes her
parents nothing by pointing out that she never requested lessons. Since she wanted and
valued lessons, it would be disingenuous if she were to assert, ‘Since I never asked for
lessons, I don’t owe my parents anything for providing them.’’’ And although Sarah
could argue that she does not owe her parents anything, this is not because she did not
ask for their sacrifice, but because she was forced to take the lessons against her will, so
Wicclair argues. The crucial point of Wicclair’s example is that Mindy got something
she wanted, although she did not request it. A similar but slightly different argument is
that of hypothetical consent: sometimes one receives benefits without being in a
position to reject them or consent to them, but one would have consented to them if one
had been in the position to do so (Li 1997, p. 212; Collingridge and Miller 1997,
p. 127). Whether the obligations incurred in this way are obligations of reciprocity or
‘merely’ of gratitude remains to be determined; the point is that the voluntarist
objection to the past parental sacrifices model does not succeed in excluding either.11
It may be true that doing one’s moral duty does not normally engender
entitlements. My neighbour has a right to privacy, which I have a duty to respect. If
I ‘do’ my (negative) duty in this regard, this does not entitle me to anything. I cannot
ask my neighbour for anything in return; his duty to respect my privacy must not be
understood in this way, for it is simply based in the same right to privacy we
(inhabitants of constitutional democracies) all enjoy. Even if I save a child from
drowning (in a situation where I have a moral duty to do so), I am not entitled to the
child’s or its parents’ gratitude. Yet here it seems that talk of obligation on their part
is not wholly out of place. That I cannot claim their gratitude does not mean one
cannot say they ought to be grateful (and show it).12
So what about parental duties? The second objection listed above seems fair
enough, insofar as it entails that children do not have to feel especially grateful to
their parents for providing them with what they owe them as a matter of justice
(minimally adequate food and clothes, for instance, and a minimal education),
assuming the parents are able to provide these things. But beyond such examples
our intuitions become blurred.13 Wicclair seems right to point out that it ‘‘is not
clear how many of the sacrifices that parents make for their children fall within the
boundaries of ‘parental duties’’’ (Wicclair 1990, p. 169), and that therefore ‘‘the
11 This holds even if it may be true that filial obligations cannot be understood in terms of an implicit
contract. Without (implicit) consent there can be no (implicit) contract, but without consent there can be
obligations.
12 This is in line with Berger’s (1975) idea of gratitude as a response to benevolence.
13 One referee for The Journal of Ethics rightly remarked that it is not a matter of course that parents
provide their children with the minima in terms of food, clothing, housing, education, et cetera. Even in
affluent countries there are parents who abandon their children or otherwise fail in their minimal duties as
parents. The reviewer suggested that therefore, some gratitude might be merited by those parents who do
fulfil these minimal duties (but nothing more). I disagree. If parents able to fulfil these duties fail to do so,
children are treated unjustly; it would be appropriate to say their rights are violated, giving them cause for
serious complaint. Children do not have to be grateful for not having their rights violated. The situation
becomes different when poor parents provide their children only with the aforementioned minima, simply
because that is all they can afford, but do so with love and care, and so on. For those immaterial ‘goods’,
which parents are also commonly expected to provide, some gratitude seems appropriate, as I argue in the
remainder of the paragraph.
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force of the statement [that children owe parents nothing for sacrifices beyond the
requirements of duty; AS] is not clear’’ (Wicclair 1990, p. 170). I would also suggest
that, whereas in some cases duties are defined in a way that makes it easy to fulfil
them or difficult to fail in them, so that everyone expects everyone else to do their
duty in those cases, there are also many situations in which what is generally seen as
within the bounds of duty is nevertheless much more demanding. We praise people
who do their duty under difficult circumstances—the obvious objection here is that,
under such circumstances, doing one’s duty (i.e., what is defined as one’s duty under
normal circumstances) may, paradoxically, be beyond the call of duty. But
parenthood is not a clearcut case. It is not at all a matter of course that people
manage to do all that is expected of them as parents, for we expect parents to be
loving, caring, supportive, et cetera, under almost any circumstances. For this reason
it does not seem odd to praise parents who ‘do their duty’ (if this is broadly defined,
as it commonly is, rather than narrowly), and it seems there is at least room for
obligations of gratitude here.14
It is true that family relations are very different from business relations. One does
not and should not keep track of the flows of benefits and sacrifices. Yet this obvious
truth is far too little proof to establish that ‘the language of owing’ is wholly out of
place with regard to, or even in (and this is a different thing), family relationships. I
agree with Post’s (1989, p. 319) statement that ‘‘[j]ustice and proportionality are as
relevant to family life as they are to all forms of social interaction’’. In good family
relationships benefits can flow one way for a considerable length of time before
anyone objects, but not endlessly. At some point, the patient benefactor will start to
notice the discrepancy between ‘what goes out’ and ‘what comes in’, and will begin
to feel that the other ought to reciprocate. Reciprocity is an important aspect of
family relations. Furthermore, it makes perfect sense to talk of justice in regard to
the family; in fact, it may be a crucial part of children’s moral education that family
relations are just and perceived by them to be so, and even that this is made explicit
by the parents (Okin 1989, pp. 17ff.). So the third objection to the past parental
sacrifices model is a serious overstatement: one cannot move from the observation
that family interactions are unlike business transactions to the view that the
language of owing is wholly out of place there, let alone in reflection on the moral
aspects of family relations.
The same goes for the fourth objection, that parental sacrifices are motivated by
love, rather than made with a view to reciprocation. Although the observation itself
is largely correct—though it may romanticize the parent–child relationship
somewhat—it cannot support the conclusion that parental sacrifices cannot give
rise to filial obligations. Keller (2006, p. 255) notes that the fact that children should
do certain things for their parents willingly and out of love, rather than from a sense
of duty, is irrelevant to the question whether filial duties exist. The same applies
here: that parents are motivated by love does not mean they are not doing their duty,
14 For a critique of the notion of obligations of gratitude, see Wellman (1999) who defends the idea that
gratitude is a virtue.
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nor does it mean that children cannot incur any obligations as a result of their
parents’ sacrifices and efforts.15
Finally, if it were true that the reciprocity model implies that parental needs are
irrelevant to the nature and extent of filial obligations, this would be a powerful
objection indeed (though not one against filial obligations as such). But it is not at
all clear that it is true. It seems to presuppose a rather simplistic view of
reciprocity—as indeed did the third objection—as requiring the return of a benefit of
exactly the same absolute size as the benefit received. Goodin (1985, p. 84), for
instance, attempts to back up his argument with the rhetorical force of this example:
‘‘[W]e would (…) be most reluctant to say (…) that children whose parents
supported them for 21 years have a sixteen percent greater debt to their parents than
those who moved out of the family home at age eighteen.’’ A more nuanced view of
reciprocity is also possible: one could argue, for instance, that when poor parents
aided their children according to their own ability and their children’s need,
reciprocity requires that children do the same for their parents when their parents are
in need. This seems to be a (more) sensible view of proportionality—and it is
perfectly compatible with, indeed requires, attention to parental needs. Furthermore,
it seems as odd to deny any relation between the magnitude of parental sacrifices
and the extent of filial duties, as to say that the extent of parental needs makes no
difference to children’s obligations. This is why some authors, as we have seen,
argue that children incur obligations when parents go beyond the call of duty. But as
pointed out above, it is unclear where the limits of parental duty lie. Moreover, there
is probably a fairly large area within which parents may move without either
obviously failing their duty or clearly exceeding it; but why should the (potentially
considerable) differences within this range not make any difference at all to the
extent of filial obligations?
In sum: the objections raised against the past parental sacrifices model fail to
discredit it completely. In line with broadly shared intuitions, both reciprocity and
gratitude are plausible elements in a complete account of filial obligations.
2.2 The Special Relationship Model
Since the friendship model of filial obligations has had such a prominent place in the
debate from the beginning, I will also briefly discuss it here, before turning to
variants of what I will call the ‘special relationship model’ that emphasize the
special nature of the parent–child relationship as a parent–child relationship.
‘‘Central to the friendship model,’’ Dixon (1995, p. 83) writes, ‘‘is that the extent
of filial obligations is determined by the extent of our friendly relations with our
parents.’’ Both English and Dixon also factor in parental needs and children’s
abilities and resources, but for English, once these are taken into account, all that
matters is ‘the extent to which there is an ongoing friendship’ between parents and
children (English 1979, p. 354). ‘‘[A]fter a friendship ends, the duties of friendship
15 See also Dixon (1995, p. 78): ‘‘That duty may coincide with inclination does not diminish its status as




end.’’ (English 1979, p. 353) According to English, this applies equally to parent–
child relations. But this means that it does not really make sense to speak of filial
obligations. Friendship entails obligations (that are different from the obligations
incurred by favours), and children have obligations towards their parents only
insofar as there is a relation of friendship between them. The fact that one is their
son or daughter is neither here nor there. At best, there is a contingent relation
between people being related as parents and children and the chance that they have
developed a friendship. English’ friendship model, then, is an example of Sommers’
DP (differential pull) model (see Section 2.3) that does not account for filial
obligations as filial obligations.16
Dixon’s friendship model improves upon English’ model in some respects. He
tries to answer the common objection that filial obligations do not end when the
‘friendship’ between parents and children ends.17 In Dixon’s view, the same is true
for friendships that were deep and long-lasting. We have residual duties to former
friends in such cases, the moral basis of which is ‘respect for our former friendships,
our former friends and ourselves’. ‘‘To treat a former close friend as a stranger (…)
is to discount our former friendship, and indirectly devalues both of us, since we
both invested part of ourselves in the friendship.’’ (Dixon 1995, p. 79) He also
emphasizes that there are real duties of friendship; that friends are not, normally,
motivated by duty does not mean there are no such duties.18 One of the main
criticisms Dixon needs to deal with is the comment that parent–child relations are
different from those between friends. Parent–child relations are characterized by
inequality of various kinds—inequality in the sacrifices made for one another, in
autonomy, in knowledge about the other, and (partly as a result of this) in power.
Moreover, parents and children ‘‘lack the independence needed for one character-
istic of deep friendships: a voluntary union between two separate people, who
achieve a friendship by growing to know and appreciate each other’’ (Dixon 1995,
p. 81).19 For Dixon, this does not invalidate the friendship model. Deep friendships
may also have these features to some extent. ‘‘It would be wiser to recognise a
multiplicity of types of friendship’’, of which parent–child relationships constitute a
special kind (Dixon 1995, p. 81). And Dixon goes on to state that ‘‘[i]f one insists
that the differences pointed out by Kupfer prevent parent–child relations from being
16 As noted in footnote 5, a similar objection might apply to the past parental sacrifices model. Are filial
obligations just instances of a general obligation to reciprocate or be grateful for other people’s sacrifices
made with a view to one’s well-being? Moreover, are parental sacrifices merely accidental to the
relationship? Against this one could argue that this model emphasizes the unique nature and extent of
parental sacrifices; exceptional cases aside, there is no analogue for this in other relationships. So one
could argue that the past parental sacrifices model draws our attention to the unique nature of the parent–
child relationship (which English does not do), but abstracts one particular element from it, which
receives all emphasis. On the other hand, even if parental sacrifices are (normally) unique in nature and
extent, filial obligations may still be generated by those sacrifices only, regardless of who made them.
This matter deserves further consideration that I cannot give it here.
17 This objection has been raised, for instance, by Callahan (1985, p. 34), and more recently by
Collingridge and Miller (1997, p. 126) and Keller (2006, p. 264).
18 See footnote 15.
19 These points about the difference between parent–child relations and relations of friendship are made
by Joseph Kupfer (1990), and are also discussed by Zola (2001, p. 190).
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regarded as a type of friendship, only a minor modification of the friendship model
will be required. (…) [A]ll that would be required would be to rename the model
(…)’’ (Dixon 1995, p. 82). I would turn this around: there is no good reason to insist
on a friendship model of filial obligations. Parent–child relations may indeed be
characterized by a kind of friendship, but they typically have important features we
do not normally associate with friendship (such as the various types of inequality
and asymmetry inherent in them, and the way they come into existence and develop
over time). If we want a model of filial obligations, and seek their basis in the nature
of the parent–child relation, it makes more sense to look at what (typically) makes
this relation special.20
Different views of what makes the parent–child relationship unique have been
put forward. Callahan (1985) emphasizes the biological relationship, and also
proposes intimacy as a source of obligation (with regard to the latter see also Nelson
2002). Gerber maintains that parents usually deserve gratitude, but also suggests
that ‘‘the love that parents have for their children is in a rather special category, and
may indeed create an actual right [to be cared for by their children] (…) albeit a
minimal one’’ (Gerber 1990, p. 32). It could also be argued that convention is what
makes the parent–child relationship unique, but I will leave this for the next section.
In the remainder of this one I will discuss what I consider to be the most promising
variant of the special relationship model, i.e., the special goods theory.
The term is Keller’s, but the approach is hinted at by Nelson (2002), where he
draws attention to parental needs that only the children may be able to fulfil. For
other needs it may be justified to make collective provisions. ‘‘What filial
obligations particularly concern are those parental needs that may not be satisfiable
in any way apart from the maintenance of a relation of intimacy with their
children.’’ Claudia Mills, too, proposes a kind of special goods theory. Her central
point is that it is a great good to participate in unchosen and unconditional(ly loving)
relationships, of which family relationships are the most prominent example. We
have prudential reasons to participate in such relationships and to make efforts to
continue them (for in so doing we also provide this good to ourselves), and moral
reasons ‘‘not to deny others the good of participating in such relationships with us’’
(Mills 2003, p. 149). She claims that ‘‘grown children owe their parents those things
that flow from participating together in an unconditional, unchosen relationship, and
not (generally) material goods that can be otherwise obtained’’(Mills 2003, p. 149).
Children owe parents only what only they can provide, namely the goods that are
internal to the relationship, rather than, for instance, money, or other things one can
in principle ‘get from anywhere’ (Mills 2003, p. 156).
Mills’ view is problematic for a number of reasons. The main issue is that the fact
that a certain kind of relationship is a great good is not in itself enough to establish
an obligation to participate in it. Further argument is needed; she could have argued,
for instance, that if a person ends her relationship with her parents, she deprives
them of the good intrinsic to that relationship, and even positively harms them,
given that they experienced their relationship to her as a good one. Mills also leaves
important things unspecified, such as when a relationship must be considered
20 Cf. Keller (2006, p. 264).
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‘toxic’, meaning that one cannot have an obligation to continue it (Mills 2003,
pp. 160–161), and when (care-dependent) parents still ‘participate’ in the
relationship with their children in such a way that the children, in participating in
it, provide the good of the relationship not only to their parents, but also to
themselves.21
Keller offers the best developed version of the special goods theory, but in
essence it is the same as Mills’ account. The parent–child relationship holds special
goods for both parents and children. ‘Special’ goods, rather than ‘generic’ goods,
because ‘‘there are no other sources, or not many easily accessible sources, from
which they can be gained’’ (Keller 2006, p. 266). Examples of these special goods
are, for parents, ‘the good of having your child, the one you raised, love and care
about, make an effort to keep in touch’, having traits in common, and parents being
‘likely to identify with and have a special understanding of their children’ (Keller
2006, p. 266). For children ‘‘[t]here is a special value in having a parent from whom
to seek advice’’, ‘‘[a]n ongoing healthy relationship with a parent can provide a link
between your life’s different stages’’ and ‘‘an understanding of the parents who
produced you can enhance your understanding of yourself’’ (Keller 2006, p. 267).
Both parents and children enjoy ‘‘the good of having someone who is especially
committed to ensuring that your needs and interests will be met, in the particular
way in which parents and children show each other concern’’ (Keller 2006, p. 267).
Keller suggests that:
the reason why you have special duties to your parents is that you are uniquely
placed to provide them with these goods, and find yourself in a relationship in
which they have provided (and perhaps continue to provide) special goods to
you. And the duties themselves are duties to provide the special goods to your
parents, within the context of the reciprocal relationship that you and your
parents share. (Keller 2006, p. 268)
Keller himself mentions two major difficulties with his account, the first
regarding the scope: ‘‘Perhaps the special goods theory does not find filial duty in
every place where it should.’’ (Keller 2006, p. 271) For instance, when someone,
through no fault of his own, would just happen to have no more concern for his
parents’ needs and well-being than for that of others, he would have no special
duties according to the theory, because he would not be well-placed to provide the
special goods. In such a case, Keller writes, ‘‘your duty might have a non-standard
source’’ (such as legitimate expectations or social conventions) (Keller 2006,
p. 272). The second concerns the question how duties flow from goods. Keller
argues that ‘‘when you are uniquely placed to provide someone with an important
good, you have a moral reason to do so, at least in some sense and other things being
21 The latter point is also important with regard to children’s prudential reasons for participating in these
relationships. Strangely, at one point Mills seems to make children’s obligations partly conditional on the
prudential reasons (Mills 2003, p. 163: ‘‘especially if I can provide it in a way that benefits me as well’’).
Another odd thing about Mills’ view, given the stress she lays on the importance of investigating the
nature of a relationship when trying to determine what obligations obtain within it, is that she believes
exactly the same obligations hold between siblings, between parents and grown-up children, and between
grown-up children and parents (i.e., both ways).
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equal’’, and that ‘‘it is not implausible to think that’’ this is all the more true in a
special relationship, when the other has provided important special goods to you,
and you can do the same without ‘‘too great a restriction of your ability to live a
good life’’ (Keller 2006, p. 273).22
In the special goods theory there is a very clear relation between the source of filial
obligations and their nature and extent. Filial obligations are ultimately contingent upon
the existence of the kind of parent–child relationship in which the special goods arise;
they do not simply come with the fact of being someone’s child. Yet they really are filial
obligations, having their source in the value of the special goods inherent in ‘healthy’
parent–child relationships. Children owe exactly those things their parents cannot get
elsewhere; they owe them the continued provision of the special goods. I would note,
however, that the special goods can sometimes be provided through generic goods,
because sometimes it is who does something that makes the difference.23
It is also worth noting that Keller’s model of filial obligations includes an
element of reciprocity. Where he states the reason why we have special duties to our
parents he explicitly mentions their having provided (or providing) special goods to
us (Keller 2006, pp. 268, 273), referring to a ‘reciprocal relationship’ (Keller 2006,
p. 268). Also, ‘‘[i]f your parents choose not to carry out their duties towards you,
make unreasonable demands, or are otherwise to blame for the deterioration of the
relationship (…) then your duties to provide the special goods to them is [sic]
mitigated or dissolved’’ (Keller 2006, p. 269). So reciprocity seems to be part of the
source or ground of filial obligations. And as noted above, where his account fails,
Keller admits other possible grounds for filial obligations. (This is in line with the
conclusions reached in Section 2.1 and, as we will see, in Section 2.3.)
Secondly, although the special goods theory captures an important element of the
moral relationship between parents and children, it does seem to me that there is more to
it than one’s being in a particularly good position to provide certain special goods. For
instance, the meaning that is derived from interaction with one’s parents or children is
important, as well as the mutual recognition. It seems forced to see such things in terms
of being well-placed to provide special goods, the goods of meaning and recognition.
This way of referring to it abstracts too much from the flow of the relationship,
solidifying into ‘special goods’ currents that are part of the flow but not extricable from
it. Relatedly, stating that ‘the good of having your children around for Christmas’ is the
kind of good ‘that your children are uniquely placed to provide’ seems to lend this ‘fact’
a contingency, an almost accidental nature, that it plainly does not have.
To be sure, Keller makes clear that one’s being well-placed to provide the special
goods arises from, and is rooted in, the special relationship—but the language of
special goods does not fully succeed in conveying this. The parent–child
relationship is heavily charged with meaning, from which it derives much of its
(moral) importance.24 In fact, it seems that some of the things mentioned by Keller
22 Daniels (1988, p. 32) writes that ‘‘children have [filial] obligations because they are in a unique
position to help parents’’; he holds beneficence to be the only plausible basis for filial obligations (cf.
Allen 1991, p. 599).
23 Richards (2010), who also proposes a kind of special goods theory, acknowledges this.
24 Cf. Gerber (1990, p. 33).
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himself (and noted above), such as the fact that for children it is especially valuable
to have a parent to ask for advice, or that an ongoing relationship with one’s parents
can provide a link between life stages, are more appropriately expressed in terms of
the meaning(s) inherent in the parent–child relationship than in terms of special
goods. There is meaning in this relationship at different levels, from the general to
the detailed: children mean continuity of the family line, parents (often) mean safety
and security—even if this is illusory; the world may appear as a colder place when
both parents are gone. As in other long-term relationships, small gestures and
phrases may carry a load of meaning—sometimes it is a burden—due to the shared
history and memory. In between the most detailed and the most general are many
meanings, often specific to the parent–child relationship as defined (to an important
extent) by social conventions (see Sections. 2.3 and 3.2). For instance, parents are
children’s first role-models, inevitably setting standards for moral behaviour, career
success, or good parenting. And for a child to reject these standards (which is very
hard to do) is very hard to accept for most parents. Too much difference between
parents and children frustrates the need to belong of both, since the family is one of
the main foci of this need.25
That the parent–child relationship is so heavily charged with meaning also means
that both parents and children have great power to do good as well as to harm each
other. Both the good and the harm can be of many and complex kinds. For instance, in
relationships of this kind there is the possibility of betrayal (cf. Goodin 1985, p. 89),
which is another indication of the moral multifariousness of these relationships—a
multifariousness that is not fully captured by the special goods account.
2.3 The Conventionalist Model
Christina Hoff Sommers’ account of filial obligations is generally regarded as the
main conventionalist account. I will limit myself to a discussion of her approach.26
Against English, Blustein, and others, Sommers argues for ‘a strong notion of filial
obligation’, and for special moral relations in general. She is especially concerned
with children’s ‘duty to honor and respect’ their parents (Sommers 1986, p. 440).
Her argument for special obligations draws on a contrast between two opposing
views of the moral domain, the domain consisting of ‘moral patients’ (in Warnock’s
terms) or all beings with ‘ethical pull’ (in Nozick’s terms) (Sommers 1986,
p. 443).27 According to Sommers, utilitarians and deontologists, although they may
differ about the extent of the moral domain, agree about its nature. To show this
Sommers considers, for the sake of simplicity, a domain consisting only of ‘moral
patients that are also moral agents’ (Sommers 1986, p. 443). ‘‘Then it is as if we
have a gravitational field in which the force of the gravitation is not affected by
distance and all pairs of objects have the same attraction to one another.’’ (Sommers
25 Baumeister ties the need to belong closely to people’s need(s) for meaning in life, and identifies the
family as a key source of meaning for most people (Baumeister 1991, pp. 145–46).
26 Confucian approaches (see Li 1997 and Wang 1998) are also to a great extent conventionalist, but I
will not discuss them here, since my concern is with approaches—and with finding an approach—that
might carry conviction in Western countries.
27 Sommers’ references are to Warnock (1971, p. 152), and Nozick (1981, p. 451).
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1986, p. 443.) In other words: that someone is my mother, father, brother, sister, or
friend, makes no difference to this person’s ethical pull, or the pull (s)he ought to
have for me—his or her pull is the same as anyone else’s. The only legitimate
reason why I might more often help my mother than a stranger in a faraway country
is that it is easier for me to do so (and, I would add, my actions are more likely to be
effective). This is the model of equal pull.
The opposing model Sommers calls differential pull. ‘‘In DP morality,’’ Sommers
explains, ‘‘the community of agents and patients is analogous to a gravitational field
where distance counts and forces vary in accordance with local conditions.’’
According to this model, ‘‘the ethical pull of a moral patient will always partly
depend on how the moral patient is related to the moral agent on whom the pull is
exerted. Moreover,’’ Sommers continues—and here she adds a conventionalist
element to the model that is not necessarily part of it—‘‘the ‘how’ of relatedness
will be determined in part by the social practices and institutions in which the agent
and patient play their roles.’’ (Sommers 1986, p. 445) The DP model recognizes
‘‘the crucial role of conventional practice, relationships, and roles in determining the
nature and force of moral obligation’’ (Sommers 1986, p. 445).
She goes on to explain filial duties by discussing another kind of special obligation,
namely the self-imposed one resulting from a promise. A.I. Melden (1977) explains
this kind of obligation in terms of a failure to respect people’s right to noninterference.
He assumes that everyone has ‘the right not to be interfered with in the pursuit of his or
her noninvasive interests’ (Sommers 1986, p. 446). To make a promise ‘gives the
promisee the action as his own’; thus, to break a promise is ‘‘tantamount to interfering
with or subverting endeavours he [the promisee] has a right to pursue’’ (Melden 1977,
p. 47). So the positive duty of promise keeping is grounded in the ‘minimalist negative
obligation of noninterference’ (Sommers 1986, p. 446).
Sommers applies this to other special obligations: the negative duty of
noninterference ‘‘is refracted by the parochial situation as a special duty which
may be positive in character, calling on the moral agent to act or refrain from acting
in specific ways toward specific moral patients’’ (Sommers 1986, p. 446). The core
of her approach is this:
The presumption of a special positive obligation arises for a moral agent when
two conditions obtain: (1) In a given social arrangement (or practice) there is a
specific interaction or transaction between moral agent and patient, such as
promising and being promised, nurturing and being nurtured, befriending and
being befriended. (2) The interaction in that context gives rise to certain
conventional expectations (…). (Sommers 1986, p. 446)
Furthermore, ‘‘because it does violence to a social role, a filial breach is more serious
than a breach of promise. (…) Causing humiliation is a prime reason why filial neglect is
tantamount to active interference’’ (Sommers 1986, p. 447).
The ‘sentimentalist’ (like English or Blustein) argues for a morality sensitive to
special relations, but ‘‘ignores the extent to which the ‘care perspective’ is itself
dependent on a formal sense of what is fitting and morally proper’’ (Sommers 1986,
p. 450). In other words, there is an important and irreducible conventional aspect to
parent–child relations, and this is an important determining factor with regard to both
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filial obligations and the various feelings and sentiments that exist between parents and
children. Sommers believes that, compared to the EP model, her DP model can ‘‘more
plausibly account for our preanalytic moral judgments concerning what is right and
wrong in a wide variety of real cases’’, as well as ‘‘for the discriminate duties that
correspond to specific social roles and expectations’’ (Sommers 1986, p. 452).
Finally, Sommers argues that the DP model can deal with the danger of ethical
relativism by adopting the deontological principle of noninterference as a standard
by which traditional arrangements in various societies may be judged and criticized:
‘‘Arrangements that are essentially invasive are unjust and do not confer legitimacy
on what is expected of those who are party to them.’’ (Sommers 1986, p. 453) She
acknowledges the conservatism of her conventionalist approach, and believes this
makes it somewhat hospitable to ethical relativism, though without yielding to it.
She in fact argues for a form of ethical contextualism (Sommers 1986, p. 454).
I see two serious problems for Sommers’ model of filial obligations. The first is that,
even if Melden’s account of the duty of promise-keeping were adequate, it is doubtful to
what extent special duties in the relational sphere are comparable to this duty. Promises
are things one makes oneself and can decide not to make. Parents, on the other hand, one
simply has, and if this comes with filial duties, this makes them unlike the duty of
promise-keeping. Sommers believes filial obligations, like promises, are grounded in the
negative obligation of noninterference. Even if one accepts Sommers’ argument that
when children are negligent in their filial obligations, this is humiliating for their parents
because it diminishes their entitlements (Sommers 1986, p. 447), is this really most
plausibly described as a violation of the duty of noninterference? In some sense, all
actions contrary to conventional expectations are a form of interference. But it seems
that what is morally salient in this case is not the interference as such, but the importance
of what is expected, which is rooted in the importance and meaning of the parent–child
relationship as such (whether conventionally defined or not).
The second problem is that to do violence to a social role is only a bad thing if we accept
the value of the social role and its specific definition. What if the definition of the social role
is morally questionable? Sommers’ answer is to argue that ‘‘arrangements that are
essentially invasive are unjust’’ and therefore engender no obligations. But if what is
appropriate within parent–child relationships is (and must be) conventionally determined,
how can we have a nonconventional, objective, view of what counts as ‘invasive’, of what
are (un)acceptable definitions of the roles of parent and child? I do not wish to suggest that
Sommers should be able to solve this problem completely, but merely that she should at
least have acknowledged it, especially because her strong emphasis on the importance of
convention makes her account particularly vulnerable to it.
These comments, however, do not invalidate the claim that conventional
definitions of social roles make a difference to filial obligations. That strong
expectations exist within parent–child relations makes for (mutual) vulnerability
and therefore power—not least power to hurt and harm. These expectations are
undeniably shaped by social conventions, which means that the obligations they
give rise to are also at least indirectly conventionally based. This holds at least when
the expectations are legitimate. But it is plausible to think that such expectations can
be legitimate—that the social roles of parent and child are not inherently
problematic, regardless of their culturally and historically contingent definition.
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Moreover, I accept that the moral importance of these conventions is not exhausted
by their indirect effect on filial obligations, through expectations and the beneficial or
harmful consequences of their (non)fulfilment. If there is a special value or meaning
(or if there are special goods) inherent in the parent–child relationship—which seems
to be true—this is only by the grace of there being such a thing as a ‘parent–child
relationship’, and this is largely due to there being these roles and a specific definition
of them. Role definitions are not the whole of the relationship, but they are constitutive
of it. An adequate model of filial obligations cannot ignore this.
3 A Contextual, Pluralist Model
In this section I will explain and defend the model of filial obligations shown
schematically in Section 3.1, which is contextual in the sense that it situates filial
obligations in the larger societal (both cultural and structural/institutional) context,
and pluralist in that it recognizes multiple (possible) sources or bases of filial
obligations. It integrates the valuable elements of the models discussed above into one
model, and includes often neglected factors, such as the relation between filial
obligations and institutional arrangements, and the connection between these
obligations and social justice issues. In other words, the model is synthetic; it accepts
the validity of various perspectives, while at the same time situating them in a broader




1. These are things that, under certain circumstances (including, for instance, the
needs, abilities, and resources of both parents and children), and given a certain
societal context, provide a basis for (general and specific) filial obligations.
Possible bases for filial obligations (such as past parental sacrifices, or the
special relationship between parents and children) do not immediately lead to
(general) filial obligations, but are, as it were, filtered and/or enhanced by social
conventions and the expectations to which these give rise, or which they allow
to arise. Of course these potential bases for filial obligations are not literally to
be imagined as free-floating, and then picked up and either diminished or
enhanced by social conventions; rather, we see that the same bases for filial
obligations are virtually universally acknowledged, but given different empha-
ses in different societies. Social conventions are (not necessarily fully
consistently) embedded in a shared worldview—as becomes clear when we
compare ‘Western’ accounts of filial obligations with ‘Eastern’ accounts. In the
latter, for instance, past parental sacrifices are an extremely important source of
filial obligations.28 Although in the previous section I have—in line with
common practice—discussed conventions as a possible basis or source of filial
obligations, in this model they can helpfully be seen as playing the role of a
mediating factor, either strengthening or weakening the connection between
(virtually universally acknowledged) possible bases of filial obligations and
these obligations. I do not believe social conventions and expectations fully
determine the nature and extent of filial obligations—i.e., the model is not
relativistic, but (merely) contextual. But, as argued in Section 2.3, they have a
considerable direct and indirect effect; the question of the relation between
social conventions and expectations on the one hand, and filial obligations on
the other, is also taken up in Section 3.2.
To illustrate the above with another example: parental neediness due to
poverty or ill health is a generally accepted basis of filial obligations in most, if
not all, cultures. It is the basis for a general filial obligation to support one’s
parents; in more collectivistic societies, however, this obligation is taken to be
much stronger than in individualistic societies, where individual autonomy and
independence are stressed (De Valk and Schans 2008, pp. 53–54). Different
conventions and expectations, in turn related to specific ideologies and
worldviews on the one hand, and different (long-standing) institutional
arrangements on the other, ‘mediate’ between parental neediness and filial
obligations. The existence of particular institutional arrangements is an
important determinant of the nature and extent of the specific filial obligations
that flow from the general ones. Thus, in De Valk and Schans’ study in the
Netherlands, 57 % of Turkish immigrants (aged between 50 and 80) and 51 %
of Moroccans agreed with the statement that children ‘should care for sick
parents’, against 11 % of the Dutch respondents in this age group. And while
28 Gerber (1990, p. 29) mentions an interesting empirical study, in which Vietnamese and American
children were asked to complete the sentence ‘‘I love my mother, but…’’. ‘‘The American children in
general completed the sentence with some sort of (usually trivial) complaint against their mothers. The
Vietnamese children never did. Instead, they supplied such endings as ‘I can never repay my debt to her’
or ‘I am too weak and small to repay her yet.’’’.
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44 % of the Turks and 34 % of Moroccans stated that ‘parents should be able to
live with children when old’, only 3 % of the Dutch agreed (De Valk and
Schans 2008, p. 59) What is important here is not just that people in fact do
things differently or hold different beliefs about how things ought to be done,
but that different moral obligations do indeed obtain in different contexts. Both
social conventions and institutional arrangements have moral relevance.
2. General filial obligations are, for instance, the obligation to ‘honour and
respect’ one’s parents, to be grateful and express gratitude, to reciprocate, to
give one’s parents (and their needs and interests) special consideration, and so
on. Filial obligations are not something separate from the parent–child
relationship, but are part of it; they belong to the moral dimension of the
relationship. They vary (at least to some extent) with the nature and quality of
the relationship. In extreme cases, such as cases of child-abuse, filial
obligations are wholly absent or annulled, but normally there are filial
obligations. The extent of a general obligation (to be grateful, for instance, or to
give one’s parents special consideration) may also differ; it is not a matter of all
or nothing. For instance, a child that was not given much special consideration
by its parents cannot (morally) be expected to give as much special
consideration to them as a child that was more fortunate in this regard. Yet
this remains a general filial obligation, for it remains unspecified what form its
fulfilment could or (in certain circumstances) should take.
Not only do filial obligations vary with the nature and quality of the parent–
child relationship; the converse is also true, for that relationship depends in part
on the way children fulfil their filial obligations (as it depends on the way
parents fulfil parental obligations). The relational context in which filial
obligations arise and exist is embedded in the societal context, which to an
important extent defines the (possible) nature of the parent–child relationship.
By the dotted lines I have tried to express the idea that, despite the ‘mediation’
in the form of filtering and/or enhancement on the one hand and specification
on the other, neither the bases of filial obligations nor specific filial obligations
are to be located outside of the relational context. For the latter, that is because
they belong to the moral dimension of the parent–child relationship as such, and
for the former it is because they arise within the context of the relationship.
(How could it be otherwise, with parental sacrifices, for instance, or with the
special goods inherent in the relationship?)
3. That children normally have (general) filial obligations leaves unspecified what
specific obligations they have, what form the fulfilment of their general filial
obligations should take. Should you be in touch regularly? More specifically,
should you visit your parents regularly? (How often?) Or is it enough to call
them occasionally, rather than call on them? Should you help them out
financially? Should you do their administration? The answer to such questions
naturally depends on both parents’ and children’s needs, abilities, and
resources, and on the nature and quality of the relationship. But it also depends
crucially on the quality and quantity of institutional arrangements benefiting the
elderly, organizing eldercare, and supporting informal care arrangements
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including care provision by children to their parents. (And these, of course,
influence needs, abilities, and resources.) Where eldercare is adequately
arranged on a collective level, through care institutions and financial and other
support, children’s specific filial obligations constitute a much more limited set
than in the absence of such arrangements. The general filial obligations would
remain, however, and certain specific obligations would still follow from
them—such as an obligation to pay regular visits to an elderly parent in a
nursing home. (See Section 3.3.) Finally, it should be noted that even the
‘specific’ obligations cannot always be described in a very specific manner—
not more specific than an obligation to pay ‘regular’ visits, for instance. But
when a parent is especially lonely, and it is clear what the effect of a child’s
visits is (and various other considerations have been taken into account
besides), it may be possible to specify this kind of obligation somewhat further,
by saying that ‘regular’ means ‘at least once a week’, for instance. But I should
immediately add that such specific obligations cannot be established from the
outside, by a third party, for it requires intimate knowledge of a host of factors
related to and influencing the relationship between the parent and child in
question—knowledge that is simply not available to outsiders. Rough estimates
of whether someone else meets his filial obligations may sometimes be
possible, but never very precise ones.
3.2 Social Conventions and Filial Obligations
In Western countries, one of the things that makes the issue of filial obligations
particularly relevant is that there may be significant differences between the
expectations of elderly immigrants and their children’s perception of their
obligations to their parents. What if an adult Moroccan woman who was brought
to Europe at a very young age does not accept the conventional Moroccan view of
filial obligations? Does she still have them?
A first response might be: that depends on whether the conventions and
expectations were legitimate to begin with. But how do we assess that? Presumably,
parental expectations are legitimate when they correspond with filial obligations.
Yet one of the claims I made was that the nature and extent of filial obligations is
partly determined by social conventions and the expectations to which these give
rise. How do we solve this conundrum?29
We must adopt a different view of the legitimacy of social conventions and
expectations. I can only offer a very brief sketch of such a view here. One criterion
for the legitimacy of conventions is that the social system of which the conventions
are an integral part should not contain or produce significant30 harm or injustice as a
result of the presence of those conventions. Another is that the conventions are of
29 I thank an anonymous referee for The Journal of Ethics for pressing me on this point.
30 Arguably, a certain ‘amount’ of harm or injustice does not disqualify conventions altogether, if they
have a ‘proven’ value (see the next criterion and the last paragraph of Section 2.3). Not all things that
might be called a harm or an injustice are equally morally significant (compare a nuisance to a lack of
food, or racial discrimination to minor but undeserved socio-economic inequalities).
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value, for instance, by ordering human relationships and interactions in such a way
that important needs (both material and immaterial) are met. When these conditions
are met, and the conventions are well-established and hardly ever departed from, so
that they ‘naturally’ give rise to certain expectations, both the conventions and the
expectations based on them can be considered legitimate. Filial obligations can then
be (partly) determined by them without circularity.31
So, returning to our Moroccan woman, it would be morally problematic for her to
simply reject the filial obligations ascribed to her without warning from one moment
to another, because parental (and other people’s) expectations would be greatly
frustrated, which—assuming these expectations and the conventions in which they
are rooted are legitimate in the above sense—would be a bad thing, with moral
relevance.32 However, if (under the influence of the society in which she lives and
her European peers and friends) she comes to hold different views, and accordingly
detaches herself from the practices related to the conventional views—including
those beneficial to her—conventional norms cease to apply fully to her.
This entails the at first sight perhaps radical conclusion that whether conventional
norms apply to someone depends in part on this person’s acceptance of them and the
worldview from which they stem. This is the case when the following conditions
apply: (1) The (non-)acceptance is fairly consistent, as opposed to haphazard or self-
serving; for instance, it applies not just to the norms that would burden him or her,
but to all norms affected by acceptance of the broader ethical outlook and the
worldview in which they are embedded. In other words, (s)he accepts all intrinsic
consequences of her (non-)acceptance—but explicitly not included here are
extrinsic consequences such as being ostracized. (2) There is room, from an ethical
perspective, for different reasonable views on the subject (which is certainly the
case when it comes to filial obligations), and she holds a reasonable, morally
acceptable view.
So, on the one hand, it is certainly possible to ‘escape’ the influence of specific
conventional norms. On the other hand, acceptance—including tacit acceptance—of
(legitimate) conventional norms implies that one is (to some extent) bound by
obligations that do not apply to people who do not accept those norms. This is,
firstly, because of the expectations to which the conventions give rise, which one
sustains by one’s acceptance of the conventional norms, and the frustration of which
would result in harm; and secondly, because due to one’s acceptance of the
conventional norms the parent–child relationship would remain defined by them.33
The nature of the parent–child relationship would be defined by these norms, and
31 Thus we can see how conventions may play a role in determining what is appropriate within parent–
child relationships, without themselves providing the standard for their own appropriateness. Of course,
justifying a non-conventional standard remains a difficult task, as noted in the discussion of Sommers’
approach (Section 2.3).
32 If parental expectations are illegitimate, children may still have moral reasons to take them into
account, because frustrating those expectations would still hurt their parents. Whether they have such
reasons will depend on the nature of the relationship; the word ‘obligation’ will at any rate be too strong
in such a case.
33 The elderly immigrants’ views on filial obligation may also change, of course, as Ingrid Robeyns
rightly pointed out to me. But they tend to be less liable to change than those of their children; I focus,
therefore, on situations in which there is a divergence between parents’ and children’s expectations.
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this would influence filial obligations to the extent that these depend on the special
meaning and value of the relationship.
I would like to stress, once again, that this does not amount to moral relativism.
First of all, I take the harm principle to be universal. The definition of what
constitutes harm is to some extent contingent on time and place, and the same goes,
therefore, for what may cause harm. But that does not make the harm principle any
less universal.
Furthermore, that filial obligations depend (in part) on the nature of the parent–
child relationship, and that this depends on social conventions, does not make
features of the parent–child relationship any less objective. A specific parent–child
relationship really has these features, even if it has them ‘only’ because of certain
conventions. The conventional basis is not a reason to question the objectivity of
these features, but it is a reason to question the import of the fact that these features
are present. Here it becomes important to distinguish what is just in the specific
situation, given existing conventions (‘imperfect’ or ‘nonideal’ justice) and what
would be ideally just—both in terms of ideal conventions and the specific situations
these could give rise to. Thus one may recognise that the (most) just thing to do in a
given situation is wholly or partially to comply with less than ideally just
conventions, while of course also recognising that ideally, these conventions would
not exist. The most just course of action would probably include some effort
towards altering these conventions.34
3.3 Social Justice and Filial Obligations
A full discussion of the relations between filial obligations and issues of social
justice would address egalitarian concerns, issues of gender justice and intergen-
erational justice, and that of ideal versus non-ideal conceptions of justice. I can only
hint at some of the connections here.
Wang (1998) places filial obligations in a broader context, asking who should
take care of the elderly: the family, or society as a whole? He asks two questions
with regard to the latter: (1) should the society have that burden? (2) can the society
or the government really provide adequate care for the elderly? He has doubts both
about the adequacy of the care that can be given by society, and about whether
society will be able to bear the burden. Interestingly, Thompson (2003, p. 13) doubts
whether family care would ensure adequate care for all elderly. Which care
arrangement is best is to a large extent an empirical matter, which I cannot go into
here. Suffice it to say that it is not obvious that being cared for by one’s children is
always better for elderly parents than to be cared for by professionals in an
institution or some other living arrangement, nor that the latter is obviously better
than the former. Most people see institutional care as far from ideal, and not without
34 As in the brief sketch I gave of criteria for the legitimacy of social conventions, I here assume, without
being able to argue for it in this article, that it is possible to formulate criteria of justice that are not wholly
culturally relative; though I should add that the distinction between ideal and nonideal justice does not
necessarily depend on this.
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reason, but it has also been clear for some time that family caring can cause severe
stress and various problems both for carers and the cared-for.35
With regard to eldercare policy it is important to note that a stress on filial
obligations tends to increase gender inequality, because it is mostly daughters who
take on the responsibility to care for their parents (Lye 1996, pp. 88–89). Economic
inequality is also reinforced where the elderly are cared for mainly by their children,
since children of poor parents are more likely to be poor themselves, and therefore
unable to assist their parents in financially burdensome ways. It goes without saying
that policies stressing filial obligations over collective care arrangements may
overlook the fact that not all elderly have children to take care of them, and that not
all children will fulfil their filial obligations. Moreover, the extent of filial
obligations also depends on the way society is structured, apart from eldercare
arrangements. Where society is structured such as to make it very difficult for
people to take time or find energy to care for their parents, it would be disingenuous
to place much emphasis on filial obligations—which is a point of critique on recent
policy in many Western countries.
The question which specific filial obligations children have, if any, cannot be
answered without taking considerations such as the above into account. Children
may have certain obligations in a non-ideal situation which, ideally, they should not
have—for instance, because on a macro-level it reproduces or even enhances socio-
economic inequality. Similarly, it seems plausible that where care for the elderly is
adequately arranged on a collective level, through care institutions and financial and
other support, children have far less filial obligations than in the absence of such
arrangements. Some types of specific filial obligations are always likely to remain
however; obligations to stay in touch, pay visits, take care of (minor) practical
matters, and so on.
Where collective arrangements are absent or inadequate, and filial duties
therefore more numerous and expansive, children may have these duties while at the
same time being under an obligation (together with others) to strive for better
collective arrangements. Like duties that flow from less than just social conventions
they are non-ideal duties, that one only has because the situation is non-ideal, and as
long as this is so—but one has them even while one is under an obligation to work
towards a situation in which one does not have them.
4 Conclusion
The central question any model or theory of filial obligations needs to answer is why
and how the specific nature of the parent–child relationship gives rise to (special)
obligations. Even the different variants of the past parental sacrifices model can be
seen as offering an answer to this question, albeit an answer that may be much more
readily compatible with the EP model of the moral domain than that given by the
other approaches. The best attempt at an answer that the literature offers is provided
by the special goods theory, yet even in its most detailed elaboration (Keller’s) it is
35 See, for instance, Steinmetz (1988) and Abel (1989).
Filial Obligations 417
123
far from comprehensive, and employs a language that runs the risk of distorting
what it aims to capture.
At this point I do not have a fully adequate answer either. A purely abstract
beginning of an answer would be that the parent–child relationship tends to be such
that both parents and children have great power both to harm or hurt each other and
to create value and meaning for each other, and that these are obviously morally
relevant facts. The contextual, pluralist model I presented shows what elements
ought to go into a more detailed and concrete elaboration of an answer. Such an
elaboration would also need to rely on a realistic, empirically informed view of
parent–child relations. For instance, Adam Smith’s observation of the affective
asymmetry of the parent–child relationship, that ‘‘Nature, for the wisest purposes,
has rendered, in most men, perhaps in all men, parental tenderness a much stronger
affection than filial piety’’ (1982, p. 142; III.3.13), if it points to something that is
true in our day and age, might cast doubt on the fairness and feasibility of Richards’
(2010, p. 240) proposal that children ought to give parents a place in their affections
roughly equal to the place they had in their parents’ affections. Another example
might be the potential moral relevance of the (sociological and psychological)
ambivalence of parent–child relations, a feature little stressed by writers on filial
obligations, but receiving increasing attention in family studies (Luescher and
Pillemer 1998; Willson, Shuey, and Elder 2003; Fingerman, Pitzer et al. 2008).
Finally, it seems to me that the study of filial obligations should confront the
question of the moral importance of such expressions as ‘but she is your mother’,
and ‘I am still his son’—expressions often given in explanation, justification, or
exhortation, that are charged with normative significance. What we need to know is
to what extent filial obligations are moral obligations, and whether there may also
be non-moral filial obligations, whether, in other words, the moral vocabulary can
fully capture the normativity inherent in these expressions.
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